The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# ENHANCING COMMAND AND CONTROL IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

RY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL LOU L. MARICH
United States Army

# **DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:**

Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

**USAWC CLASS OF 2002** 

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20020806 200

#### **USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT**

# **Enhancing Command and Control in Multinational Operations**

by

LTC Lou L. Marich United States Army

Captain Steven W. Nerheim, USN Project Adviser

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

#### **ABSTRACT**

**AUTHOR:** 

Lou L. Marich

TITLE:

Enhancing Command and Control in Multinational Operations

FORMAT:

Strategy Research Project

DATE:

29 April 2002

PAGES: 37

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Multinational operations have become the norm for United States forces. U.S. policy recognizes and emphasizes the importance of multinational operations, stating that the U.S. "will act with others when we can," and will "fight in concert with regional allies and friends." These requirements present military leaders with a unique set of challenges and demands. An examination of these shows that command and control (C²) is the critical primary tool needed for success in multinational operations and that commanders must actively build relationships, trust, cooperation, and cohesion; overcome language and cultural barriers; develop common procedures or norms; and establish effective communication means, technical as well as procedural; ultimately leading to true interoperability among the members of a multinational force. In addition, the transformation of U.S. forces has the potential to further exacerbate the complex and delicate nature of multinational C². Technological shortfalls, combined with inability to integrate our cutting edge technologies with our multinational partners, will force leaders to seek and implement innovative, low-tech solutions for effective C². This paper examines aspects and challenges of multinational ground operations C² and offers ideas and concepts for facilitating and improving C² in multinational operations.

# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

ABSTRACT	ii
NHANCING COMMAND AND CONTROL IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS	1
LAND FORCES—THE MOST COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT C2 ENVIRONMENT	2
NAVAL FORCES	
AIR FORCES	3
LAND FORCES	
AN OVERVIEW OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS	
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE	4
RESURGENCE OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS	4
DOCTRINE FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS	
THE ROAD TO DOCTRINE	8
CURRENT U.S. DOCTRINE FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS	9
MULTINATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURES	9
INTEGRATED COMMAND WITH A LEAD NATION	10
PARALLEL COMMAND	10
LEADERSHIP QUALITIES FOR MULTINATIONAL COMMAND	11
STAFF	13
CONTROL REQUIREMANTS FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS	14
INTEROPERABILITY	15
Training	
Communications	
Language	16
Doctrine	
Compatible Structures	
IMPACT OF TRANSFORMATION ON MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS C2	19
RDO AND EBO	
CREATING INCLUSIVE C <sup>2</sup> SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES	
TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACH	
PROCEDURAL APPROACH	
COMBINATION APPROACH	
ENSURING SUCCESS IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS	
NONOTES	25

XIBLIOGRAPHY29
----------------

#### ENHANCING COMMAND AND CONTROL IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Only from the alliance of the one, working with and through the other, are great things born.

--- Antoine-Marie-Roger de Saint-Exupery

Today, multinational operations have become the norm for United States forces. The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) recognizes and emphasizes the importance of multinational operations and states that the U.S. will "demonstrate the ability to form and lead effective military coalitions," will act "in alliance or partnership when others share our interest" and that U.S. force presence overseas "helps deter or even prevent conflict" while "allowing for maximum military cooperation with our allies and therefore encourages burdensharing." The importance of multinational operations is also highlighted in the U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) which states that "overseas presence enhances coalition operations by promoting joint and combined training" and "demonstrate[s] our ability to form and lead effective coalitions."

These requirements present military leaders with a unique set of challenges and demands. They include building relationships, trust, cooperation, and cohesion; overcoming language and cultural barriers; developing common procedures or norms; and establishing effective means of communication, technical as well as procedural. Getting this right will ultimately lead to true interoperability among the members of a multinational force. While many of these tasks are difficult to accomplish even in a national setting, they become extraordinarily difficult in a multinational environment.

The ongoing transformation of U.S. forces has the potential to further exacerbate the complex and delicate nature of multinational command and control (C²). Information-based technologies currently under development are already changing C², and in the future may revolutionize and profoundly alter the very nature of C² across the strategic-operational-tactical spectrum. As U.S. forces transform and embrace the concepts of rapid decisive operations (RDO) and effects based operations (EBO), the exercise of effective command and control over participating multinational forces will become even more important. While technology has the potential to mitigate many potential problems, historical experience with the implementation of enabling technologies has left a great deal to be desired. Technological shortfalls, combined with the inaccessibility of cutting edge technologies to many of our multinational partners, will force leaders to use innovative, low-tech solutions for effective C² of multinational operations.

To successfully lead ad hoc, complex, short-fused multinational operations, leaders will have to focus on the most critical elements of coalition leadership. An examination of multinational operations illustrates that the foundation for allied and coalition operations is based on trust, cooperation, and cohesion. It also reveals C<sup>2</sup> as the crucial primary tool needed to ensure success in multinational operations. This paper examines the various aspects of and challenges to C<sup>2</sup> of multinational ground operations, and offers ideas and concepts for facilitating this vital function in the difficult environment of multinational operations.

# LAND FORCES—THE MOST COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT C2 ENVIRONMENT

I can truly attest from my own experience that solving the problem of combined command in war is simpler and more expeditious than solving the joint problems in our national defense establishment in peace.<sup>3</sup>

-General Harold R. Bull

While C² of multinational forces is equally applicable to all functional components—ground, air, and maritime—it is important to look at each component's perspective on C². The nature of each elemental regime combines with the traditions of the various services, to develop unique C² perspectives in each service. This creates different levels of difficulty and complexity in conducting multinational operations. As an example, while the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force practice the principle of centralized planning and decentralized execution, the Army's much more controlled execution process is necessitated by the complexity of ground operations and the Army's historical roots.

#### **NAVAL FORCES**

The nature of naval forces—mobility, independence of action, self-sufficiency, broad scope of mission, and a long standing tradition of operating in an international environment—made the U.S. Navy an expeditionary service from its inception. The Navy's C² is established on the foundation of command autonomy, and upon the long standing international laws of the sea. The Navy established its modern C² structure with the arrival of modern communications technologies such as radio and satellite communications. Its modern C² concepts were started in World War I, fine tuned during World War II, and honed to perfection during the Cold War years as the Navy conducted operations with its NATO allies. Because each navy ship is a fighting platform, capable of independent or coordinated action, the Navy developed self-

contained systems based on high technology automation systems. These systems operate on the world's oceans and seas, a relatively open environment that does not complicate communications like a cluttered land environment. The Navy also operates in an international environment that has its own existing, standardized and approved international signals, codes, and procedures. Combined with the Navy's own standardized operational procedures, the Navy's C<sup>2</sup> system, while complex, is the most standardized, flexible and adaptable, and therefore the best equipped to facilitate complex multinational operations at sea or in littoral waters.<sup>4</sup>

#### AIR FORCES

The U.S. Air Force's C<sup>2</sup> requirements are broadly similar to the Navy's in many ways. Like the Navy, Air Force operations are conducted in an international environment that has its own set of established rules. Its operational procedures were also developed during the same period as the modern Navy's, and were fine tuned during operations such as the Kosovo air campaign. Like the Navy, the Air Force is a technology-driven service that fights aircraft as weapon systems and its pilots have autonomy similar to a navy ship captain's. The Air Force also operates in a relatively clutter-free environment that facilitates communications. Finally, English is the international language for air operations, civil and military. This critical aspect of air operations facilitates multinational operations by immediately removing one of the most important barriers to effective C<sup>2</sup>. As a result, the Air Force's modern command and control systems and operational procedures provide an adaptable and flexible system that facilitates C<sup>2</sup> of multinational air operations.<sup>5</sup>

# LAND FORCES

Ground operations continue to be the most complex and difficult to execute. A ground force commander has to contend with the full spectrum of variables that make C² as much art as it is science. This includes communicating and moving units in a ground clutter environment, coordinating a larger number of units, with less visibility of their location and status. In a multinational environment, the ground commander operates with allies whose forces have no common force structure, no common operational procedures, equipment, or capabilities, and no common language. Therefore, while all commanders face challenges operating in a multinational environment, it is clear that the ground force commander has the greatest C² challenges.

#### AN OVERVIEW OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

#### A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Multinational military operations have been a critical element of warfare throughout history. Whether conducted under the umbrella of an alliance or a coalition, emperors, kings, and later nation states combined their common goals and sense of purpose to conduct multinational military operations against a common enemy or threat. While multinational operations are prevalent across the span of European history, they became a prominent part of United States history only during the twentieth century.

Our nation's early reluctance to be involved in multinational operations was based in George Washington's farewell address: "T'is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." However, as the U.S. became a major industrial power at the end of the nineteenth century, it assumed a prominent role in world affairs and was inevitably drawn into the major conflicts of the twentieth century. This new geopolitical role brought with it an initially reluctant move away from isolationism and a gradual acceptance of leadership in international affairs. Despite this, the national leadership maintained a reluctance toward multinational operations. General Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II, expressed his skepticism of multinational operations:

"History testifies to the ineptitude of coalitions in waging war. Allied failures have been so numerous and their inexcusable blunders so common that professional soldiers had long discounted the possibility of effective allied action unless available resources were so great as to assure victory by inundation. Even Napoleon's reputation as a brilliant military leader suffered when students in staff colleges come to realize that he fought against coalitions – therefore against divided counsels and diverse political, economic and military interests."

Despite these concerns, General Eisenhower also acknowledged that "America's transformation... to might in battle" could be attributed to "the development... of near perfection in allied conduct of war operations." General Eisenhower clearly understood the complexity of multinational operations and the importance of getting this difficult military undertaking right after almost four years of multinational leadership with requisite lessons from experience during a major conflict. He understood that while the political foundation for multinational operations

would be laid, in many cases, in the capitals of the participating nations, the military challenge of multinational operations extended down to the operational and tactical level.

#### RESURGENCE OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

The value of coalition operations was seen in Kosovo. NATO's solidarity was central in compelling the Belgrade regime to accept its demands. It signaled a political resolve and moral force that was greater than any unilateral action could have mustered. Moreover, Operation Allied Force could not have been conducted without the efforts of the entire Alliance and depended on such allied contributions as forces, bases, and infrastructure and transit access.<sup>9</sup>

While U.S. forces conducted multinational operations throughout the 1900's, that century's closing decade saw an increased emphasis on warfighting in partnership with allies. While the U.S. always reserved the right of unilateral action, many factors contributed to the increased emphasis on multinational operations. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact shifted the geo-political landscape from a bipolar to a unipolar global strategic environment.

At the end of the twentieth century, the U.S. was left as the sole super power. More importantly, it became the only nation possessed of the global ability to project power, a capability unmatched by any other nation. As the world political climate of the early 1990's destabilized into numerous crises, the world community, and in some cases domestic concerns, pressured the U.S. to take action to resolve various crises "du jeur" (Panama, the Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo).

As the U.S. took military actions around the globe in the 1990's, either unilaterally or as part of a coalition, it faced a paradox: international pressure for greater U.S. involvement in solving crises while at the same time facing growing world-wide perception and concern that the U.S. was becoming the world's policeman. While the U.S. possessed the ability to conduct unilateral actions, whether invited to or not, it was clear that it would face increasingly strong international pressure over legitimacy, particularly when U.S. vital national interests were not at issue.

As illustrated in the NSS, multinational operations provide this legitimacy, and establish broader acceptance of U.S. actions. Multinational operations also provide an opportunity for U.S. Forces to work with established and emerging nations that are not a part of existing U.S.

alliances or security frameworks. The exposure of these new partners to U.S. national values—democracy, market economy, rule of law, civilian control of the military, and individual freedoms—along with U.S. Forces' military ethic and capabilities, serve to propagate these ideals over a much wider audience of nation states than is possible through normal bilateral contacts.

With world stability decreasing and the number of contingency or small-scale operations increasing, the demand for the unique capabilities of U.S. Forces is on the rise. Our unique capabilities carry significant costs for strategic lift, logistics, intelligence, and precision munitions, which have the potential to make unilateral actions prohibitive in all but the most vital cases. The ability to conduct multinational operations creates an opportunity for burden sharing. Creating regional capabilities through initiatives like Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), develops interoperability between participating nations, and utilizes each participating nation's unique capabilities while allowing the U.S. to maintain regional influence, establish credibility and legitimacy. While this burden sharing does not reduce our strategic lift, logistics, intelligence, and precision munitions costs, in the long run, it reduces our manpower expenditure while providing critical regional and global access, intelligence, and political influence.

While multinational operations are not the answer to every contingency, it is clear that these operations offer unique benefits and deserve a prominent role in both the NSS and the NMS. Given the number of multinational operations, the importance placed on them, the risks associated with them, and the political/diplomatic costs of failure, it was inevitable that the U.S. Joint Staff and the separate services published doctrine for multinational operations.

#### **DOCTRINE FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS**

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines multinational operations as "a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance." Therefore, multinational military operations can be broken out into two categories: alliances and coalitions. While alliances and coalitions have unique definitions, they are frequently referred to as combined operations or, more frequently, as multinational operations.

More than anything, multinational operations are based on the relationship between the participating nations. While many factors can form the basis for a relationship between nation states, common national interests, goals, and real or perceived common threats or enemies are

the most frequent and credible reasons for multinational cooperation. Winston Churchill illustrated this when he alluded that he might make a pact with the devil if required to fight Hitler.<sup>11</sup> When these common threads are reinforced by the vital interest of national survival, they result in one of the most common and strongest reasons for military multinational cooperation.

Joint Publication 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, defines an alliance as "...the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long term objectives which further the common interests of the (alliance) members." Therefore, key aspects of alliances are the intended longevity and formality of the agreements. These two conditions allow and occasionally require military leaders to establish dialogue and to develop formal, structured, well defined protocols for multinational or combined operations. NATO serves as perhaps the best-known example of an alliance. For over fifty years, NATO's political and military leaders have developed and refined Standarization NATO Agreements (STANAGs), to deal with all aspects of the alliance, including C<sup>2</sup> procedures for strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. In the complex world of multinational military operations, STANAGs and long experience make C<sup>2</sup> of NATO forces relatively easy compared with that of coalition forces.

Joint Publication 3-16 defines a coalition as "an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action." A key aspect of coalitions is their generally short-term, limited objective character. The "short notice" nature of coalitions precludes the establishment of many of the procedures developed over the long periods in/by an alliance. Instead of depending on formalized relationships, coalitions depend much more on cooperation and coordination. Therefore, coalition military operations are more complex and military coalition leaders face a much more daunting task in commanding and controlling multinational forces that, at best, may agree to a common purpose and like objectives, and at worst, can be a loose conglomerate of forces with divergent agendas.

Alliances and coalitions have a common purpose. Both serve to accomplish the common goals of participating nations. When these goals are shared, alliances and coalitions can create broader international support and may increase the legitimacy of multinational action. While alliances and coalitions have differences, it is clear that military operations involving either alliances or coalitions are multinational operations and therefore present similar challenges. It is also evident that the difference between these two types of multinational operations is in the level of effort required of the commander to effectively lead his multinational force.

#### THE ROAD TO DOCTRINE

From the time the U.S. conducted its first multinational operations, there has been recognition of the need to formalize the resulting complex relationships. During WW-I, General John J. Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, recognized the allies' problems in conducting coherent multinational operations. Without agreements formalizing relationships between national forces, and more importantly defining the limits of command imposed on a Supreme Allied Commander by the participating nations, the allies suffered extreme difficulties in orchestrating coordinated operations against the Germans. General Pershing was instrumental in establishing these protocols which proved critical in bringing WW-I to a rapid conclusion.<sup>14</sup>

While the seeds of effective multinational operations were planted in the concluding year of WW-I, they were left to wither during the inter-war period. As WW-II started, nations forming alliances found that their military forces had to relearn the lessons of WW-I. Despite the slow start, the allies considered the implications of multinational operations up front and implemented formalized agreements for multinational operations from the start. Sir Winston Churchill recognized the importance of coordinating the war effort at the highest level. In a minute to his Chiefs of Staff, he outlined the need for a "measure of guidance and control... from the staffs and from the high government authorities." During the next four years, U.S. forces honed their multinational operations skills, and by the end of the war reached the pinnacle of multinational capability.

Following WW-II, U.S. forces remained deployed throughout the world, often in multinational roles and operations with allies. Demobilization and the emerging short-service conscript system bled away much of the interoperability skill.

In the Korean War, U.S. forces led multinational operations in a United Nations sponsored coalition. The loss of critical multinational operations skills, especially at the tactical level, led to a reluctance by the allies to place their troops under complete U.S. control. Despite this, U.S. leadership prevailed since the U.S. had the preponderance of forces and capabilities in Korea. After the termination of hostilities, there was again a degradation of capabilities for multinational operations.

Following the Korean conflict, a unique two-front opportunity emerged for U.S. forces to enhance their ability to operate with allies and partners. First, the intensifying Cold War provided an opportunity to establish long-term stable alliances in different regions of the world. The most notable of these was the NATO alliance. The second was the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Some lessons relearned the hard way in Vietnam still provide a basis for working

with low-tech allies and within coalitions. U.S. forces learned invaluable lessons in both Korea and Vietnam.

The NATO experience had a much broader and more significant impact. NATO allies faced an increasing Soviet threat, which gave impetus to developing the critical requirements for multinational operations. These included compatibility, interoperability and in some cases, even interchangeability which permeated the allied forces at all levels. Most importantly, the NATO alliance developed a workable command and control system with established procedures and rules for multinational operations. Even after the end of the Cold War, NATO command and control procedures facilitated U.S.-led operations such as the Gulf War, Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo. Despite these successes, our solo failure in Somalia and the multinational failure in Bosnia caused Americans to question the value of multinational operations, especially those not under U.S. lead. Experiences in these operations provided the foundation of our emerging doctrine for multinational operations.

#### **CURRENT U.S. DOCTRINE FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS**

Current U.S. doctrine for military operations is outlined in a number of publications, including Joint Publication 3-16 and the U.S. Army's Field Manual (FM) 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations*. These manuals list the fundamentals of multinational operations, define the types of operations conducted by alliances and coalitions, and list operational considerations for these types of operations. Among the most important concepts in these publications are the tenets of multinational operations. These include requirements for cooperation, itself comprised of respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, and patience; rationalization, standardization, and interoperability; and command and control.

## MULTINATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURES

...that the adoption of unified command [in the theater] would solve nine tenths of the problems of British-American cooperation<sup>17</sup>

—The War Department

Command of multinational forces is the most contentious and challenging aspect of multinational operations. Two contentious issues which must be resolved are: "Who will command the multinational force?" and, "What authority will the commander have?" These issues create tension because all contributors to multinational forces, even in well developed

alliances, struggle with the scope of command authority over their forces granted to another nation's commander. This tension is exacerbated by the natural desire of nations to control the employment of their own forces. General George C. Marshall was aware of this struggle and addressed it in his orders to General Eisenhower before Eisenhower took command of the multinational forces operating in North Africa. He stated that each national commander "should have the maximum feasible degree of authority and responsibility" and that he "should operate at all times under as broad a directive as possible."

#### INTEGRATED COMMAND WITH A LEAD NATION

U.S. doctrinal publications outline three possible command arrangements. Alliances and coalitions share the first of these: integrated command with a lead nation. The primary difference in integrated command between alliances and coalitions is the degree of subordination each nation allows the multinational force commander. Coalitions typically have one of two command structures: parallel command or a combination of lead nation and parallel command. Lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs whose composition is determined by the coalition leadership. Many of the complications arising from parallel command can be overcome. Establishing a lead nation—usually the nation with the preponderance of forces or capabilities in theater—focuses command unity of effort and eliminates many of the complications associated with parallel command.

#### PARALLEL COMMAND

FM 100-8 states that parallel command is the "easiest to organize and is often the organization of choice." This command arrangement may be modified as coalitions mature. Doctrinal publications stress that unity of command established early in the operation facilitates unity of effort. Since nations are generally reluctant to grant total control of their forces to one lead nation, a multinational force commander's best option may be to emphasize unity of effort. During WW-I, General Pershing recommended to the War Department: "The principle of unity of command is undoubtedly the correct one for the Allies to follow. I do not believe that it is possible to have unity of action without a supreme commander. We have already experienced enough in trying to coordinate the operations of the Allied Armies without success. There has never been Real Unity of action." General Pershing understood the importance of unity of command and the difficulty in achieving that goal in multinational operations, especially those not involving high intensity conflict.

It is important for a multinational force commander to understand and accept the limits of his command authority. Unlike a national command, a multinational command will in most cases coordinate the actions of allied forces, provide strategic direction to military operations, and will serve as the integrating force on the ground. A multinational commander under the lead nation concept will not command in the same manner as he would his own national forces. While commanders always have the right to appeal to their governments if they feel their forces are being placed in danger, today this appeal has devolved to include even disagreement with an operation. Applying national command rules and procedures to force this issue further exacerbates the problem and could cause a breakdown in C<sup>2</sup>.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, multinational command is very similar to strategic leadership and command of joint forces. It requires consensus to work and demands unique skills from the leader.

#### LEADERSHIP QUALITIES FOR MULTINATIONAL COMMAND

A leader is the man who has the ability to get other people to do what they don't want to do, and like it.

-Harry Truman

The complexities of multinational command make it clear that, more than anything, the personal traits and qualities of the commander determine the success of multinational commands and multinational operations. The manner in which the commander discharges his duties establishes the critical relationships within a coalition. His mannerisms, attitudes, and actions are instrumental in setting the climate within the command, from the highest headquarters down to the tactical units executing the mission. General Eisenhower illustrated these requirements for Admiral Mountbatten as Mountbatten was preparing to take command of the multinational forces in the South East Asia Command:

"The written basis for allied unity of command is found in directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The true basis lies in the earnest cooperation of the senior officers assigned to an allied theater. Since cooperation, in turn, implies such things as selflessness, devotion to a common cause, generosity in attitude, and mutual confidence, it is easy to see that actual unity in an allied command depends directly upon the individuals in the field. This is true if for no other reason than no commander of an allied force can be given complete

administrative and disciplinary powers over the whole command. It will therefore never be possible to say the problem of establishing unity in any allied command is ever completely solved. This problem involves the human equation and must be met day by day. Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings, particularly with all persons of the opposite nationality, and firmness, are absolutely essential."<sup>22</sup>

Many of the skills required for successful multinational command are similar to the leadership skills taught to all U.S. military leaders. Leaders must be able to fine tune basic leadership skills for the peculiarities of coalition operations.

Multinational force commanders must be deft in building trust among nations, leaders, and institutions through personal contact and liaison. This is especially critical when operating with coalition forces that have differences in doctrine, capabilities, language, and culture, all of which present obstacles in direction, coordination, and support of the multinational force. To do this, a commander must be visible to his multinational contingents and must not show even the perception of favoring one ally over another. Personal bonds develop between coalition commanders through trust and the knowledge that the coalition commander's word is his bond and that he, while being demanding, will always be fair. Once this relationship is established at the highest level, it will permeate throughout the alliance or coalition.

Multinational force commanders must also be sensitive to the requirements of their subordinate non-U.S. commands, to their commander's concerns and interests, and finally to the role each nation plays on his staff. To do this effectively, the commander must operate on an inclusive rather than an exclusive basis whenever possible. This is especially important when U.S. forces are operating with partners outside already established alliances or bilateral agreements. Security requirements will challenge the ability of U.S. commanders to share some intelligence information with allies. Commanders must be willing to take risk by developing workarounds to this delicate issue.<sup>23</sup> This accommodation will be recognized and appreciated by most allies, and will pay dividends in cooperation.

When planning missions, a multinational commander must be aware of operational limitations that may be imposed on his subordinate units. A commander and his staff must find innovative ways to get their allies to accomplish missions that would otherwise be unacceptable to international subordinates. This was very evident during U.S. operations in Bosnia where multinational units were subordinate to Task Force Eagle (TFE), the U.S. element of Multinational Division North (MND (N)). As an example, TFE routinely conducted combined

missions into areas considered too sensitive or when missions were perceived to be politically unacceptable by the nation normally responsible. In addition, to lessen mission unacceptability to allies, missions were framed in different context (i.e. training).<sup>24</sup>

In addition to his multinational staff, commanders must make extensive use of liaison officers (LNOs) in their headquarters. Since LNOs are personal representatives of the multinational commanders, and are normally senior in rank, they may have insights into their commander or their command, and may greatly facilitate communications between commanders. Finally, a commander must, whenever possible, work through his multinational staff. While more ponderous and slower that a nationally pure staff, incorporating allies early in the planning process facilitates mission execution and command and control.

#### STAFF

Command of multinational forces requires a level of coordination between the multinational forces that varies with the scope of the mission, the size of the units, and the proximity of units to each other. Specifically, parallel command normally requires LNOs, while a lead nation command is characterized by staff integration. The composition of the integrated staff is determined by the coalition leadership and is a way for the commander to ensure unity of effort.<sup>25</sup>

No matter what the mission requirement, staffs play a crucial role in facilitating command and control in a multinational environment by integrating the effort of all parties into unity of effort if not unity of command.<sup>26</sup> When combined with the LNO elements within a HQ, the staff can provide a multinational force commander with a variety of options normally not available to a national HQ.

To improve the effectiveness of a multinational headquarters with participating nation components, an integrated multinational staff requires unique leadership skills. Difficulties in matching different staff systems and nationalities require that leaders first and foremost integrate the staff while maintaining mutual respect and confidence in their capabilities to ensure sound development of plans and to develop directives "fully representing the interests of the major elements of the command."<sup>27</sup> The best way to do this is not to weigh a particular structure or organization as a method, but to organize the staff as required to facilitate command and control. The commander should place emphasis on the characteristics required of a good staff officer: confidence, logic, and loyalty. This staff integration will allow for a planning process that can master the increased coordination and decision making involved in combining the interests and objectives of two or more national militaries and their respective governments. Overcoming

differences in viewpoints and capabilities requires the attention of force commanders, their staffs, and all associated personnel and all leaders involved in this process must make conscious efforts to increase respect, rapport, knowledge, and communication at every step. <sup>28</sup> Most importantly, commanders must ensure that allied staff officers have relevant duties.

A part of establishing an effective staff should be the establishment of formalized coordination and liaison arrangements between the leaders and the staffs of the participating national military elements. This should be followed with integration training for each staff officer and LNO. This training should include as a minimum a familiarization with the lead-nation's organization, capabilities, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Ideally, this training would also include familiarization with each participating nation's organization and capabilities since each nation will continue to execute its assigned missions using their national TTPs.

The last step in creating a truly integrated and effective multinational staff is to ensure situational awareness within the staff and among the LNOs. This is best accomplished by ensuring that the staff participates in all aspects of staff work, from operations planning, to participating in the daily operations updates, tracking of operations, VIP briefings, and information collection. Finally, commanders should afford their staff the ability to leave the HQ and visit all the units in the multinational organization. This serves two purposes. It provides the staff officers with an opportunity to get an on the ground appreciation of current operations and subordinate unit concerns, and this informal professional development pays off when the staff officer returns to HQ to plan the next mission.

A cohesive, integrated, and participatory multinational staff will provide a multinational commander with quality planning and improved control over operations. As an added bonus, officers working on these staffs will be co-opted into U.S. methods and, as a result, may assist the commander in persuading or coercing commanders from other nations to follow or adopt our strategy, ideas, or procedures.

#### **CONTROL REQUIREMENTS FOR MULTINATIONAL FORCE OPERATIONS**

Successful execution of multinational operations requires the establishment of procedures and effective integration of systems. Ideally, some of these measures should be accomplished prior to the requirement for forming the coalition. The critical components of effective control include communication systems, language, common terms of reference, interoperability, an understanding of each nation's doctrine, and standardized procedures. While some of these can be executed "on-the-fly," prior training and engagement with the nations

involved in the coalition will greatly facilitate multinational operations. The best way to achieve the highest level of control in a multinational force is to achieve a level of interoperability.

#### INTEROPERABILITY

Since total integration and commonality of systems will never be achieved in an ad hoc multinational force, interoperability presents the best alternative. Some degree of interoperability is essential for multinational operations. To achieve some measure of interoperability, national and multinational force commanders must address the "Four Pillars of Interoperability: Training, Communication, Doctrine, and Comparable Structures."<sup>29</sup>

## **Training**

"... between September 1939 and May 1940, the allies had never conducted any exercises, either with or without troops, (although) an indoor exercise on the model could easily have been held..."

"Train as You Fight" has served as an axiom for U.S. Forces and many of our allies. <sup>31</sup> The same rule should also apply to multinational operations. During the Cold War, U.S. Forces routinely participated in multinational training exercises with allies. The most visible of these exercises was the annual Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER), which involved hundreds of thousands of troops and thousands of combat systems maneuvering in their anticipated operational areas in Germany. These exercises were invaluable because they provided an opportunity for interoperability from the tactical to the operational level. Commanders and their staffs had an opportunity to exercise in operational headquarters, exercise their multinational staffs, practice a common operational doctrine, and learn and practice a common operational language. This in turn led to increased cohesion, improved morale, and a knowledge that the allied forces could fight together and win. Lessons from these exercise led to standardized operational procedures and some commonality of equipment (e.g. munitions calibers).

Forward presence of U.S. forces in their anticipated theaters of operation played a key role in facilitating these large scale exercises. The close proximity of U.S. Forces to their allied counterparts enabled exchanges from individual to unit level. It allowed soldiers and leaders to attend common schools which reinforced our common doctrine and tactical and technical

procedures. These training opportunities afforded the alliance an opportunity to resolve issues and work out solutions.

With the post-Cold War reduction in U.S. forward presence, came a dramatic decrease in large-scale interoperability exercises like REFORGER. C<sup>2</sup> of large scale exercises has been replaced with command post exercises using computer simulations. Large unit-level exercises have been replaced by smaller scale programs like Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) which focus on the emerging democracies and potential future partners throughout the world. As a result, we are gaining an appreciation for operations with a number of emerging nations at the expense of operational interoperability with our traditional partners.

These changes of training opportunities and environment will make multinational operations more challenging in the future, especially if those operations are conducted on the high end of the conflict spectrum. One way to compensate for a lack of large scale exercises is to conduct increased engagement operations. Pre-hostilities engagement, if structured around interoperability training and staff exchanges, will greatly facilitate operations in the future, whether in combat or operations other than war.

#### **Communications**

Communications are an essential requirement for all operations and are especially critical for successful multinational operations, where the fog of war is thickened by different languages, different procedures, and different equipment. The ability to communicate is essential and revolves around three key elements: common or understandable language, common terms of reference (i.e. doctrine or operational concepts), and a common or interoperable means to deliver the message from the commander to the executing unit or between units. While this is self evident, each of these elements has unique requirements and challenges for international operations.

#### Language

Speaking a common language is sometimes difficult even in a national organization. In a multinational operation, a common operational language is the Rosetta Stone which allows understanding and enables mission execution. As the scope of U.S. multinational military operations increases in both number and the diversity of locations, finding a common language becomes exponentially difficult. While U.S. forces would like to have all coalition forces be conversant in English, many forces have a very limited capability to operate in English. In some

cases, even if they do have this capability, they continue to operate in their native language. Special Operations Forces (SOF) who receive language training as part of their professional development, and contracted linguists, along with limited numbers of linguist trained soldiers, sailors and Marines, provide U.S. forces with the ability to overcome language barriers. Since these assets are limited and normally in high demand, we must look for alternatives to overcoming language barriers.

Language barriers may be overcome in four ways. The easiest is to increase the number of contracted linguists required for a particular operation. While this is feasible for lower intensity operations like peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, it becomes impractical for higher intensity operations. The second way to improve linguistic capabilities is to train additional soldiers as linguists. This solution is complicated by the additional funding requirements for training, the requirement to maintain proficiency, and the associated time away from units for soldiers.

The third method for improving our forces' linguistic capabilities is to make second language proficiency a part of commissioning requirements for officers. U.S. Military Academy or Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets should be required to learn a foreign language as part of their studies while the services would have to provide proficiency training either through assignment to regions where their language is spoken or through distance education. Officers assessed through Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) would meet the same requirement as part of their degree completion program or studies prior to entering OCS. This solution would provide the services with a broad language base and would enable officers, who will serve in leadership roles during multinational operations, to develop one of the critical skills for working in a coalition or alliance environment.

The last method to improve linguistic capabilities is by using technology to facilitate communications. While a "Star Trek" style universal translator is still science fiction, technology has produced working systems that allow near-simultaneous translation between languages. These computer based systems are gaining wider use, especially in SOF, and were successfully used for operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. While the technology is workable today, further miniaturization combined with functional voice recognition would provide a truly indispensable system for enhancing communications.

The best method to increase U.S. forces' linguistic capabilities, until speech translation technology is perfected, is to combine the language training requirement for officers with technology. A reasonably proficient speaker would be able to take this communication technology, ensure that translations were not taken out of context, and provide the appropriate

colloquialisms to make communication truly functional. In the absence of common language, adequate linguists and adequate technology, doctrine (or a set of common terms of reference) can serve to mitigate operational problems.

#### **Doctrine**

Doctrine provides a frame of reference for military forces, and therefore provides the starting point for any understandings between multinational partners. Doctrine provides the context for understanding a nation's forces, organizations, capabilities, and operational concepts. Multinational forces "must understand one another's doctrine, and doctrines cannot be too dissimilar." In this context, doctrine serves as a unifying element by exposing multinational partners to the procedures, ideas and methods of other partners. Doctrine can be invaluable in overcoming different military cultures and values. As a result, it can co-opt military partners or allow them to adjust their procedures to more closely coincide with ours—ideally resulting in seamless operations. This is especially critical for C² when we may be operating with militaries that do not subscribe to similar C² principles and procedures.

While doctrine is frequently tied to technological capabilities, it can not depend solely on them. As U.S. forces transform, technology will change how our forces execute operations, thereby more firmly linking our doctrine to technological capabilities. These expected technological advances will continue to expand the "capabilities gap" between U.S. forces and potential collation partners, making multinational operations increasingly complex and difficult. To compensate for the divergence in C² capabilities, we must maintain a compatible C² structure with our key allies and coalition partners or we must implement procedures to bridge the technological divide.

#### **Compatible Structures**

National unit and C<sup>2</sup> structures serve as the skeletons upon which operational muscle and capabilities are hung. Organizational structures provide a frame of reference for operational forces, indicate force capabilities and organizational interaction, and facilitate logistical and support operations.<sup>33</sup> Examined in a multinational context, it is clear that great operational benefits could be derived from multinational forces with the same or similar organizational constructs. These benefits would allow member forces to easily understand their partners' forces and would facilitate interoperability, especially for C<sup>2</sup>.

While there may be some similarities between close allies, diversity rather than homogeneity is the norm in multinational operations. Militaries operating in multinational

operations will differ greatly in their unit and C<sup>2</sup> structure. This is the most difficult aspect of multinational operational to address, because national forces derive their structure from their culture, operational experiences, and military capabilities, which are themselves derived from their national economic and technical capabilities. Therefore, multinational operations must construct separate organizations to allow the basics of C<sup>2</sup> and support, and develop administrative organizations to facilitate interoperability and cohesive operations through common understanding.<sup>34</sup> This construct requires that C<sup>2</sup> be facilitated through compatible C<sup>2</sup> systems, through the exchange of C<sup>2</sup> systems and LNOs, or through the implementation of procedures which compensate for C<sup>2</sup> disparities.

# IMPACT OF TRANSFORMATION ON MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS C2

Forces built for the Cold War are quickly becoming obsolete....likely to face threats more challenging because they can also leverage modern technologies such as satellite services for communications, navigation, and surveillance, low-cost biological and chemical weapons, and cruise as well as ballistic missiles.<sup>35</sup>

U.S. forces are undergoing a transformation and a paradigm shift in how they will fight, command, and control operations in the future. Rapid decisive operations (RDO) and effects based operations (EBO) are key tenets which will shape these transformation efforts. Forces emerging from the transformation will be more capable and will be able to operate as a "[fully] capable, integrated joint force." These concepts call for creating a super blitzkrieg effect to deliver devastating effects on the enemy, not just from integrated service capabilities, but also from the combined elements of national power (information, economic, and diplomatic). To attain this holistic approach, the U.S. must continue to engage in multinational operations as they indirectly facilitate the execution of the non-military elements of power while providing U.S. forces access to the area of operations.

#### RAPID DECISIVE OPERATIONS AND EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS

RDO is a joint concept that "requires the seamless integration of multiservice forces to facilitate coherent joint operations." By logical extension, if multinational operations are the preferred way to fight, RDO must also facilitate coherent multinational operations. RDO call for "rapidly project[ed] national power across global distances," and "integrated superior knowledge and command and control capabilities," and "interoperability that extends to the interagency and

multinational elements."<sup>39</sup> A key concept of RDO is continuous, multidimensional, long-range, precision operations which are linked to throw the enemy off balance and never permit him to recover.

EBO are a subset of RDO, and employ tools and relationships other than traditional attrition operations against the enemy by "generating very specific, detailed effects" to achieve desired operational results. <sup>40</sup> For EBO to work, U.S. forces must exploit the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA) which integrates distributed command and control with remote sensors providing fused intelligence, and combine them with a common operational picture to "digitize the battlefield," thus allowing our forces to achieve desired effects at a time and place of our choosing.

While multinational operations are imbedded in RDO, it is difficult to see how our coalition partners will participate in operations with the U.S. without receiving U.S. enablers. More importantly, global power projection with long-range precision weapons, combined with the increased warfighting and distributed command and control capabilities of ground forces, lowers the profile of U.S. forces in theater. This may create a perception of an empty battlefield, one devoid of U.S. forces.

These perceptions could complicate multinational operations in three ways:

- Allies would not have the ability to easily link up with U.S. forces.
- U.S. multinational force commanders would want to use coalition forces to achieve specific effects, resulting in a perception that the U.S. is using allies as "cannon fodder."
- Under these circumstances, the U.S. may not have the preponderance of forces, while it will have the preponderance of capabilities. While this should be sufficient to maintain lead nation status, there may be resistance form coalition partners who traditionally view lead nation status based on the size of the force present in the theater of operations.

To mitigate these perceptions and to facilitate cohesive and integrated multinational operations, the U.S. must develop C<sup>2</sup> technologies that incorporate our allies into the joint and interagency team conducting RDO. If we fail to do this, future multinational operations will be hobbled by a range of forces from those capable of synchronized, high-tempo operations to those simply unable to communicate.<sup>41</sup>

### CREATING INCLUSIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

As U.S. forces move out with transformation, there is a growing realization of a developing technological gap between the U.S and its allies. This gap appeared in the late 1980's/early 1990's, as the Army initiated its digitization experiments and started looking at Army XXI and "The Army After Next." The other services initiated similar programs and all services began active participation in joint warfighting experimentation. The gap appeared publicly during the Bosnia and Kosovo campaigns. At that time it became clear that U.S. forces were developing a qualitative differential over our allies. Current operations in Afghanistan dramatically illustrate how wide this capabilities gap has grown. To redress this imbalance, the U.S. can use three approaches: a technological approach, a procedural approach, or a combination of the two.

# TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACH

In an attempt to try to reduce the gap, the U.S. urged NATO to pursue the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), a program seeking improved capabilities in mobility, sustainability, effective management, command, control and communications, and survivability. Improvements in these areas would contribute to future coalition operations while allowing the U.S. to share the developmental costs of emerging technologies. In addition, the Allies would benefit by shortcutting the development processes, thereby incorporating critical technologies early. Ultimately, DCI implementation would contribute to common capabilities and would therefore improve allied interoperability.<sup>42</sup>

As an example, the U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration Program has initiated 68 projects since its inception. More than a third of these programs have benefited from Allied involvement. One such program, launched in 1998, has enabled the U.S. Army C<sup>2</sup> systems to operate with those of Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom by developing and refining the method of exchanging information via NATO standard messages directly between national databases. Another program is helping ground, air, and naval coalition forces in Korea synchronize deep strikes.<sup>43</sup>

The technological integration of C<sup>2</sup> systems can result in a multinational force that operates with speed and precision, while being capable of finding and hitting enemy forces rapidly and with a minimum of friendly casualties.<sup>44</sup> Technology clearly has a role to play in developing modern C<sup>2</sup> systems. However, high technology solutions face two major hurdles that limit their full potential. First, budget constraints and national protectionism of military-industrial complexes limit effective integration. Second, security concerns for proprietary technologies

prevent full implementation of C<sup>2</sup> technologies in multinational formations. A procedural approach will be required to compensate for technological C<sup>2</sup> limitations.

# PROCEDURAL APPROACH

Our technologically-based forces (and our technology enamored culture), drive us to seek high tech solutions to C<sup>2</sup> problems between multinational forces. While this is ideal if technically possible, multinational operations require the interpersonal element for effective communications. Kosovo made it apparent that increased emphasis must be given to "concepts of operations." Although technology is important, it is not the only path to success.<sup>45</sup>

Procedural measures will be operationally driven and may include the establishment of LNO teams and C² node teams manned by soldiers to operate the equipment and control the access to the C² technology. These teams have to exist prior to their required employment. Ideally they would participate in an interoperability command post exercise with the headquarters they support. LNO and C² teams would assist in the development of standardized procedures for each nation with which they operate. The biggest operational challenge for these teams will be "plugging in" to the supported allies' information and C² pipes without violating the rules that preclude C² from providing a purely technical solution. The resulting standardized procedures would address many of the interoperability concerns outlined earlier (i.e. procedures, common terms of reference, the establishment of trust and confidence with the supported forces, and language), and allow effective operations with minimal preparation. After looking at both technological and procedural approaches to improving C², it is apparent that a combination approach is the ideal solution to this vexing problem.

#### **COMBINATION APPROACH**

Since technology is unlikely to completely resolve C<sup>2</sup> issues in multinational forces and the procedural approach does not have the capability to provide adequate C<sup>2</sup> support, commanders will have to develop innovative combination approaches to facilitate C<sup>2</sup> of multinational operations. In some cases, commanders will have to combine C<sup>2</sup> teams with LNOs so the LNOs can serve as information filters. At other times, the C<sup>2</sup> team may be easily integrated with supported forces and provide the information required for effective C<sup>2</sup>.

Since multinational operations are an order of magnitude more complex than pure national operations, C<sup>2</sup> will remain a priority for multinational force commanders. Successful multinational operations will always contain an increased requirement for interpersonal relations

and commanders will have to maintain vigilance toward subordinate units while continuing to combine all aspects of leadership and technology to ensure operational success.

#### **ENSURING SUCCESS IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS**

Allied Force was a success because the Alliance was politically united. It taught us about coalition warfare and identified future needs. Perhaps the most important lesson (need) is that the Alliance must pursue improved military capabilities for coalition warfare and the best way to do that is by working together. Collectively, we can achieve the unified military action that will be critical to the success of future coalition operations.<sup>46</sup>

Multinational operations have become routine to U.S. military operations and their importance will grow in the future as we fight the Global War on Terrorism and continue to provide stability in many regions of the world. U.S. joint and service doctrine lays out the blueprint for successful multinational operations. Yet despite this, U.S. forces continue to be challenged when conducting these types of operations and as a result are reluctant to wholeheartedly execute them. Because multinational operations are so complex, there are no simple solutions and each operation is unique because of the actors involved and their divergent interests, capabilities, and the degree of familiarity of with all the other participants. The complexity of multinational operations requires extra effort to prepare our leaders and forces.

Future success requires a three pronged approach. First, leadership training should incorporate the development of the critical skills required for successful leadership in a multinational environment. These skills should be developed from the earliest point in officer education since operations today can have strategic implications at the lowest tactical level. Second, despite the current trend to pull U.S. forces back to the continental United States, a concerted effort must be made to afford U.S. forces with every opportunity for engagement with forces throughout the world. Current and previous operations clearly demonstrate the vital role engagement plays in establishing the basic requirements for understanding and working with allies around the world. Third, we must leverage technology to improve the coordination and thereby control between multinational forces. This must include both the technical means which enable communications as well as more open access to the technology.

In the near-term, we must increase interoperability with key potential coalition partners. This will serve as a stepping stone to our goal of improving multinational operations. Our near-term focus should expose a wide cross section of U.S. forces to many current and future allies. The result of this engagement will be a U.S. force comfortable operating in a multinational and non-U.S. centric environment. It will develop a broad based knowledge of foreign military capabilities, structures, doctrine, equipment, and customs. Finally, this engagement will expose future multinational forces to our systems, procedures, and values, and will plant a seed with our future allies which will be much easier to cultivate in the future.

For the mid-term, our focus should be the development of both leadership and procedural workarounds. Leadership training should incorporate the skill sets required by coalition leaders. This includes language training, regional orientation, negotiation and cultural skills as well as methods to mitigate multinational misunderstandings that are bound to occur. Leaders exposed to multinational operations via engagement will develop the ability to more fully integrate our partner's capabilities. In this concept, leaders receive formal training and the basic skills required for multinational leadership. In turn, they are exposed to multinational operations through engagement and later return to the educational institutions to formalize procedures for dealing with allies.

For the longer-term as U.S. forces transform, we must ensure that provisions and measures are imbedded in our technology to facilitate multinational command. At minimum, this should include language translation capabilities, allies' force structure, doctrine, procedures, and customs databases, and gateways for information exchange. We must ensure that our allies understand the implications of RDO and EBO on ground based operations and multinational force command and control requirements. Our use of ground based forces for non-linear operations to achieve a desired effect, like a weapon system today, will place increased stress on C<sup>2</sup> of multinational forces, primarily through misperceptions of force presence on the battlefield. Future operations, where contributions to multinational operations are based on effects rather than force presence, require that we take the requisite steps today to ensure future technologies enhance multinational operations C<sup>2</sup> while we prepare our leaders for future "human" command and control of multinational operations challenges.

WORD COUNT = 9,059

# **ENDNOTES**

- <sup>1</sup> William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a Global Age</u> (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000) 5, 17, 19.
- <sup>2</sup> U.S. Government Printing Office, <u>National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995</u>. Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era (The white House, February 1995), 13, 19.
- <sup>3</sup> Harold R. Bull, <u>Combined Operations Planning</u>, (Lecture to AFSC, 25 Apr 1949); quoted in Anthony J. Rice, <u>Command and Control in Coalition Warfare: Does History Provide Us With Practicable Solutions for Today?</u>, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 11 March 1996), 13.
- <sup>4</sup> Vice Admiral Mike Mullen, "Commanding NATO Operations from the Sea." <u>US Naval Institute Proceedings</u> (August 2001), Vol. 127, No. 8: 44-48.
- <sup>5</sup> The ideas in this paragraph are based on the remarks made by the speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series. He indicated that during the Kosovo air campaign, the allied air effort was effectively coordinated from a central Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) after overcoming problems with communications, intelligence sharing, and tasking priorities. The speaker indicated that the CAOC could serve as the model for command and control of future coalition air operations.
- <sup>6</sup> George Washington, "Farewell Address," 1796; available from http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm>; Internet; accessed 19 March 2002.
  - <sup>7</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, (New York: Doubleday and Co, 1948), 4.
  - 8 Ibid.
- <sup>9</sup> Joseph J Eash III., "Harnessing Technology for Coalition Warfare," <u>NATO Review</u> (Summer 2000), Volume 48, Issue 2/3: 32.
- <sup>10</sup> Department of Defense, <u>Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</u>, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 April 2001), 282.
- <sup>11</sup> Churchill College, Churchill Archives Centre: Exibitions: Churchill and Russia, "Churchill Papers, CHAR 20/76/139, 20 June 1942, available from <a href="http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/gallery/russia/CHAR\_20\_76\_139.shtml">http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/gallery/russia/CHAR\_20\_76\_139.shtml</a>; Internet; accessed 19 Mar 2002. As Churchill tried to forge an alliance with the United States, Hitler made him the gift of another powerful ally the Soviet Union. Despite his intense hatred of the Communists, Churchill had no hesitation in sending aid to Russia and defending Stalin in public. "If Hitler invaded Hell," he once remarked, "I would at least make a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons."
- <sup>12</sup> Joint Staff, <u>Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations</u>, Joint Pub 3-16 (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff 2000), GL-4.

<sup>13</sup> lbid.

- <sup>16</sup> Winston S. Churchill, <u>Minute to the Chiefs of Staff</u>, 24 October 1943; quoted in Anthony J. Rice, <u>Command and Control in Coalition Warfare: Does History Provide Us With Practicable Solutions for Today?</u>, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 11 March 1996), 8.
- <sup>17</sup> The War Department, <u>Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-2</u>, US Army in World War II (Washington: US Department of the Army, 1953), 123-4.
- Regional Military Organization, "Allied Unity of Command in the Second World War: A Study in Regional Military Organization," Political Science Quarterly (September 1952): 412.
- <sup>19</sup> Department of the Army, <u>The Army in Multinational Operations</u>, Field Manual 100-8 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 11 September 1995), 2-2.
- <sup>20</sup> General John J Pershing, <u>My experiences in the First World War</u>, vol.1 (New York: Da Capo Press 1995), 375.
- During the Summer of 1997, TFE routinely conducted numerous in the Russian Brigade's sector which was primarily in the Republika Srpska area of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These operations were designed to show TFE resolve and ability to operate anywhere in its area of operations, without interference by the Serb population. To ensure these operations would be politically acceptable to the Russian government, the Russian Brigade commander consulted with his higher national HQ on numerous occasions and in a few cases declined the mission unless it was conducted with a U.S. force as a combined operation. In addition, a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series indicated that the NATO force commander in Kosovo refused to execute the SACEUR's order to seize the Pristina airfield in Kosovo and prevent the Russian forces from occupying the airfield. Both of these anecdotes illustrate that commanders, especially in peace lower-intensity operations, are more likely to question orders form a non-national coalition commander.
- <sup>22</sup> Alfred D. Chandler Jr, Editor, <u>The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The War Years III</u> (the John Hopkins Press, 1970), 1420-24.
- <sup>23</sup> The Nordic-Polish (NORDPOL) Brigade in TFE was comprised of five nations: Denmark and Norway, both NATO members, and Finland, Poland, and Sweden, all non-NATO members. Brigade commander and deputy commander positions rotated between member nations and resulted in command by a non-NATO member. To successfully execute orders without violating the chain of command, TFE frequently had to find ways to share intelligence with non-NATO members and worked around NATO-only orders issued by the IFOR HQ. These methods were not the "approved" security solutions, but were implemented in order to successfully complete critical missions.
- <sup>24</sup> TFE frequently framed missions in a different context so that they would be acceptable to the nation that had to execute them. Russian Brigade preferred to do combined "training" missions with U.S. forces, especially in Muslim occupied areas of their sector. Polish forces

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Rice, 3-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Ibid. 6-10.

were reluctant to conduct patrols in the Bocina Donja area which was occupied my muhajadeen remaining in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the war. TFE planned and executed combined Turkish-Polish Brigade patrols, the first time these two armies worked together since they fought against each other at the gates of Vienna.

<sup>25</sup> U.S. forces are reluctant to include allied staff officers in staff planning and operations. This is based on perceptions ranging from a belief that language barrier will be a problem and unnecessarily complicate the staff process, to different perceived and real work ethics; to "we are the only one that know how to do this operation the right way." While some of these issues are present real challenges, many can be easily overcome with a little effort and will in the long run pay great dividends in successful execution of coalition operations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Mark B. Yates "Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm," Military Review (Oct 1993): 48.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Each nation in a coalition brings a different perspective to accomplishing a mission, providing diversity and innovative approaches to difficult operational issues. As a minimum, U.S. staffs need to listen to the allied staff officers and consider their recommendations. If they are feasible and acceptable, then U.S. staffs should not hesitate in adopting that course of action. If the allied solution is not feasible or more frequently politically acceptable to U.S. leadership, coalition leaders must get involved and explain to the allies why the mission should be accomplished in a different way. While initially slower, this process will bring the allies "on side" and in the ling run will greatly facilitate mission planning and execution.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> JFQ: Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 2000, Issue 25, 127.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Brigadier General William J Mullen III and Lieutenant Colonel George A Higgens, US Army, "Four Pillars of Interoperability", <u>Military Review</u> (January 1992): 47.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Field Manual 100-8, 3-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Mullen, 47.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Mark R. French, <u>Digital C3 Systems on the Modern Battlefield tactical Systems with Strategic Implications for Combined Operations</u>, USAWC Research Project. (Queen's University: Queen's Centre for International Relations, 1 May 1999), 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Eash, 32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Jeffery J. Baker, "Operational Concept Found: Rapid Decisive Operations as a Joint Operational Concept," <u>Army</u> February 2002, 50.

<sup>37</sup> lbid.

<sup>38</sup> lbid, 49.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Ibid, 50.

- 40 Ibid.
- <sup>41</sup> French, 1.
- <sup>42</sup> Eash III., 34.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid, 32.
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Ibid.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid, 34.

#### **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Ash, Lawrence N. "Fighting For Network Centric Warfare." <u>US Naval Institute Proceedings</u> (Aug 2000, Vol. 126, No. 8)
- Bainbridge, Joseph R. "Toward a Multinational Future." <u>Army Logistician</u> (Sep-Oct 2000, Vol. 32, Issue 5).
- Becker, Jeffrey J. "Operational Concept Found: Rapid Decisive Operations As a Joint Operational Concept." Army (February 2002).
- Brower, Scott E. "The ACRI Command and Control Challenge." <u>Parameters</u> (Winter 2000/2001, Vol. 30, Issue 4)
- Bull, Harold R. <u>Combined Operations Planning</u>, Lecture to AFSC, 25 Apr 1949. Quoted in Anthony J. Rice, <u>Command and Control in Coalition Warfare: Does History Provide Us With Practicable Solutions for Today?</u>, Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 11 March 1996.
- Canella, Charles J. "China-Burma-India: Study in Combined Command." <u>Military Review</u> (July 1965)
- Chandler, Alfred D. Jr, Editor, <u>The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The War Years III.</u> New York: John Hopkins Press, 1970.
- Churchill, Winston S. "Churchill Papers, CHAR 20/76/139, 20 June 1942: Remark on why he worked hard to build an alliance with Stalin." Available from <a href="http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/gallery/russia/CHAR">http://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/gallery/russia/CHAR</a> 20 76 139.shtml. Internet. Accessed 19 Mar 2002.
- Clinton, William J. <u>A National Security Strategy for a Global Age</u>. Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2000.
- Cushman, Lt Gen John H. "Command and Control in the Coalition." <u>US Naval Institute</u> <u>Proceedings</u> (May 1991, Vol. 117, No. 5)
- Deverell, Jack. "Coalition Warfare and Expeditionary Operations." <u>RUSI Journal</u> (February 2002, Vol. 147, Issue 1).
- Eash III., Joseph J. "Harnessing Technology for Coalition Warfare." NATO Review (Summer 2000), Volume 48, Issue 2/3: 32-34.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. Gen. Crusade in Europe. New York: Doubleday and Co. 1948.
- Forster, Larry M. "Coalition Leadership Imperatives." <u>Military Review</u> (Nov-Dec 2000, Vol. 80, No. 6).
- French, Mark R. <u>Digital C3 Systems on the Modern Battlefield tactical Systems with Strategic Implications for Combined Operations</u>. USAWC Research Project. Queen's University: Queen's Centre for International Relations, 1 May 1999.

- Hunter Keeter. "Gansler: Globalization, Interoperable Tech Keys to Future." <u>Defense Daily</u> (2 August 1999)Database on-line. Available from UMI ProQuest, Bell & Howell; accessed 10 Mar 2002.
- Jasper, Stephen. "Network Centric Warfare Depends on Who's Plugged In." <u>C4i News</u> (Vol. 14, Issue 14).
- Joint Staff, <u>Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations</u>, Joint Pub 3-16. Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 2000).
- Keithly, David M. and Stephen P. Ferris. "Auftragstaktik, or Directive Control, in Joint and Combined Operations." Parameters (Autumn 1999, Vol. 29, Issue 3)
- Leighton, Richard M. "Allied Unity of Command in the Second World War: a Study in regional Military Organization," Political Science Quarterly (September 1952): 399-425.
- Mullen, Vice Admiral Mike. "Commanding NATO Operations from the Sea." <u>US Naval Institute</u>
  <u>Proceedings</u> (August 2001, Vol. 127, No. 8)
- Mullen, Brigadier General William J. III and Lieutenant Colonel George A Higgens, US Army. "Four Pillars of Interoperability." Military Review (January 1992): 47.
- "Multinational Operations." Joint Forces Quarterly (Summer 2000, Issue 25).
- Pershing, General John J. My Experiences in the First World War, vol.1 New York: Da Capo Press, 1995.
- Pope, William R. "U.S. and Coalition Command and Control Interoperability for the Future." Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 19 Jun 2001.
- Rice, Anthony J. Command and Control in Coalition Warfare: Does History Provide Us With Practicable Solutions for Today?, Strategy Research Project. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 11 March 1996.
- RisCassi, General Robert W. "Doctrine for Joint Operations in a Combined Environment: A Necessity." Military Review (January-February 1997).
- Scales, Maj Gen Robert H., Jr. "Trust, Not Technology, Sustains Coalitions." <u>Parameters</u> (Winter 1998/1999, Vol. 28, Issue 4)
- U.S. Department of Defense. <u>Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated</u>
  <u>Terms.</u> Joint Publication 1-02. Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 April 2001.
- U.S. Department of the Army. <u>The Army in Multinational Operations</u>. Field Manual 100-8. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 11 September 1995.
- U.S. Government Printing Office, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995. Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era (The white House, February 1995), 13, 19.

- U.S. War Department. <u>Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-2</u>. US Army in World War II. Washington: D.C. US Department of the Army, 1953.
- Van Nederveen, Gilles, "Technology for the Future Leaders: International Command and Control Enhancments." <u>Aerospace Power Journal</u> (Summer 2001, Vol. 15, Issue 2).
- Washington, George. "Farewell Address." 1796. Available from http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm>. Internet. accessed 19 March 2002.
- Yates, Mark B. "Coalition Warfare in Desert Storm." Military Review (Oct 1993): 46-52.